George Siskos, ThD (Doctor of Theology)
An article with the title ‘Logomachy,
Orthodoxy, and the Holy and Great Council’ dated 7/6/2016 by
Protopresbyter Dr Doru Costache has been posted on the official website
of the Press Office of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for the Holy and
Great Council ((https://www.orthodoxcouncil.org/-/logomachy-orthodoxy-and-the-holy-and-great-council),
criticising the views of Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos and St
Vlassios regarding the theology of the person, in accordance with his
intervention in the Hierarchy of the Church of Greece on ‘The Essential Problems with the Holy and Great Council’ (http://www.parembasis.gr/images/AGIA_MEGALH_SYNODOS_2016/NAYPAKTOY-IEROTHEOY_AMSOE-problemata-1.pdf (Article in Greek)).
The article by the Romanian writer, with
obvious irony and a tinge of journalistic oversimplification,
reproaches the Metropolitan of Nafpaktos for an “anti-personalist
crusade”, which he considers is “out of place these days” with regard to
the Holy and Great Council, and which, according to his impression,
actually betrays “human, all too human, passions” and power games. Set
firmly within the atmosphere of American-Australian ‘culture’, the
Romanian writer gives his criticism of the Metropolitan of Nafpaktos
with regard to the ontology of the person (which formed part of the
official letters to the Synod of the Church of Greece) the title “Game
of Thrones”, which is the title of one of the worst American television
series, in which innumerable assassinations, intrigues and all kinds of
psychological distortions and carnal perversions take place between
royal houses.
The Romanian writer’s article presents, among others, the following views. “The
attack [by the Metropolitan of Nafpaktos] contains the outrageous
statement that the theology of personhood, with its trademark, the
freedom of personal will as distinct from the necessary character of the
natural will, annihilates the Trinitarian God.” “By opposing the
language of personhood as theologically valid, Metropolitan Vlachos
denies contemporary theology its task to convey the wisdom of the
ecclesial tradition in ways that take in consideration our current
circumstances and reach out to audiences of today.” “The opposition of
the Metropolitan to contemporary person-centred theology has no
traditional ground and seems to depend on foreign ways of thinking.”
“The Metropolitan outrageously affirms that ‘the link between will and
person destroys the Trinitarian God by introducing tritheism.’” “The
statements of Metropolitan Vlachos [are] attached to the Babylonian
captivity of Orthodox theology to foreign, Western medieval ways of
thinking.” “Metropolitan Vlachos is of the opinion, which derives from
his naturalism or monophysitism (as defined above), that will belongs to
nature and that there is no will of the person. Ecclesial tradition
stands in firm and consistent opposition to his views.”
The Romanian writer’s obvious
unawareness of the analysis of the rejection of personalistic
vocabulary, which the Metropolitan made in the Synod (http://www.parembasis.gr/index.php/menu-teyxos-236/4432-2016-03-05)
prior to the text “The Essential Problems with the Holy and Great
Council”, is sufficient on its own to betray the ill-fated amateurism of
the academic draft of the Romanian writer. The view of the Romanian
writer that the criticism made by the Metropolitan of Nafpaktos is out
of place and wrongly timed, and that it shows selfish interests and
personal passions, unfortunately testifies that the consciousness of the
Romanian writer himself is out of place and wrongly timed. The texts of
the Council, if they stay as they are, are going to validate and
institutionalise by conciliar decision a terminology, that of “the
ontology of the person”, which has a series of theological
significations for the mystery of the Holy Trinity, the concept of the
primacy of the Orthodox Church, the concept of asceticism, the concept
of nature, the concept of sin, the concept of deification, the concept
of participation in the Trinitarian God, and many other things.
1. Methodology and Aim of Personalistic Hermeneutics
The way in which the Fathers adopted
philosophical terminology has to do with innovating names in accordance
with the truth of things in Christ. The method of personalistic
hermeneutics, by contrast, is to adopt the patristic terms, change the
patristic significations, and replace them with the significations of
contemporary philosophy and every kind of contemporary thinking, which
makes the personalistic fabrication attractive. Personalists often name
this “pastoral sensitivity in imitation of the incarnation of the Word.”
On the other hand, adhering to the patristic terms and their
significations is characterised as love of antiquity, sterile
historicism, and a museum display of dead civilisation.
The abyss of inadequate knowledge
deepens when the personalistic narrative refers to the dialogue of the
Fathers with the heretics of their age. This is an obviously
over-simplified and tragically distorted version of historical reality,
when one reads, for example, the prologues of the anti-heretical
writings of St Athanasius against the Arians and of the Cappadocian
Fathers against Eunomius, the letters of St Cyril to Nestorius, of St
Maximus to Severus of Antioch and the Monothelites, and of St Gregory
Palamas to the Latins.
The same applies, of course, to the
other ideological tenet about the Fathers adapting themselves to the
needs of their era by adopting philosophical terms. The Fathers
themselves admit that they prefer the terms used in Holy Scripture, but
they are obliged to use philosophical terms to refute heretics, as
philosophical terms were being introduced unchanged, with all their
first and last significations, by the heretics and were seeping into the
Christian faith, altering its content. Classical instances of this are
the philosophical preservation of the simplicity of the divine essence
by the solutions of the dynamic and modalistic Monarchians; the
philosophical introduction of ‘uncreatedness’ only for God the Father by
Arians and Eunomians; and the philosophical axiom of the Antiochian
tradition that every nature is necessarily manifested self-subsistently,
which turned the Nestorians to terminal schism and the
Anti-Chalcedonians to admit only one nature for Christ.
The method of specifically theological
hermeneutics, which pervades the greater part of life in Christ, has
existed only for a few decades, but it has already been subjected to
very serious criticism by the Clergy and a considerable number of
academics and theologians. The textual documentation for specifically
theological hermeneutics is extraordinarily weak. Unfortunately, it is
based on isolated passages that are linguistically suited its
ideological aims. Of course, just by looking up the whole page of the
passage referred to, one very soon notices the alteration of the
meanings of the text in favour of the desired personalistic conclusions.
2. Person – Freedom – Will
The core of personalistic hermeneutics
is the freedom of the Person. This is achieved in God Himself, through
the will of God the Father, Who is freed from the necessity of His
nature. The remaining Persons of the Holy Trinity exist from the freedom
of the Father to beget the Son and to cause the procession of the Holy
Spirit, whereas their existence remains free thanks to the communion of
love, on account of the hypostatic will of each Person to choose this
communion freely. Personalism speaks directly about three hypostatic
wills. It comes as a surprise that the Romanian writer, with a thesis on
St Maximus, is unaware (?) of the multiple references by St Maximus to
the fact that three hypostatic wills entail tritheism and split the
Triune God. If the will is hypostatic, as each hypostasis is different,
the will of each Divine Person will also be different, which results in
three different Gods. Lossky, to whom the writer refers, being
honourable in his interpretation and a sincere Christian, mentions that
the theology of the Person does not exist in the Fathers, but even more
surprising is that he admits his perplexity in the face of the patristic
attribution of the will to the nature.
Of course, personalists, including the Romanian writer, are so fatally attached to the priority of the person as against the nature, that they treat any assertion about natural will as Western essentialism. They are incapable of a balanced interpretation of nature and hypostasis. They verbally declare that there is no hypostasis without nature and vice versa, but in fact they remain so attached to the priority of the person, that every assertion about natural will and natural energies is stigmatised as scholastic essentialism. All the same, the natural origin of the divine will is asserted many times in the dialogue of St Maximus with Pyrrhus, in all the saint’s theological and polemical works, and above all in the anthology of the Lateran Council (649) and the Sixth Ecumenical Council, entitled On Natural Wills.
Of course, personalists, including the Romanian writer, are so fatally attached to the priority of the person as against the nature, that they treat any assertion about natural will as Western essentialism. They are incapable of a balanced interpretation of nature and hypostasis. They verbally declare that there is no hypostasis without nature and vice versa, but in fact they remain so attached to the priority of the person, that every assertion about natural will and natural energies is stigmatised as scholastic essentialism. All the same, the natural origin of the divine will is asserted many times in the dialogue of St Maximus with Pyrrhus, in all the saint’s theological and polemical works, and above all in the anthology of the Lateran Council (649) and the Sixth Ecumenical Council, entitled On Natural Wills.
3. Nature and Necessity
The identification of nature and
necessity, in other words, that everything natural constitutes a
necessity, whereas the will that originates from the person is something
free, was used by the Arians to demonstrate to St Athanasius the Great
that the Son is begotten of the volition of the Father, in other words,
He is a creature. It was used by Apollinarius of Laodicea to demonstrate
that every human nous is necessarily sinful, so it is impossible that
Christ assumed a human nous. It was used by Theodore of Mopsuestia to
demonstrate that God does not dwell among human beings either according
to His essence or according to His energy. It was used by Nestorius of
Constantinople and Theodoret of Cyrrhus to demonstrate that the union
according to hypostasis spoken of by St Cyril of Alexandria abolished
the freedom of God the Word, therefore the only true union of God and
man was the identity of volition between the two personal, hypostatic
wills of the man Jesus and God the Word. It was used by the Monothelites
to demonstrate that, if Christ had two wills, they would necessarily be
opposed to one another, and that the human will would be sinful, so
Christ must have one hypostatic will. What is more, it was used by the
Monothelites to demonstrate that a human natural will, being subject to
necessity, would bind Christ’s volition, so Christ must have one
hypostatic will.
Personalism, by identifying nature with
necessity, in other words, by asserting that everything natural
constitutes a necessity, whereas the will that comes from the person is
what safeguards freedom, often repeats the same arguments as the above.
For personalism, the hypostatic will of the Father safeguards the
freedom of the divine essence from any kind of necessity. The
incarnation frees the Son from the necessity of His divine nature. The
gnomic will of Christ (sic) is free from every necessity of divinity and
humanity. And all this, although St Athanasius of Alexandria and the
Cappadocians testify to the exclusion of any kind of necessity from the
divine nature. In parallel, St Cyril of Alexandria and St Maximus the
Confessor testify that no created noetic being is subject to necessity.
4. Identification of Createdness with Sin
In personalism, createdness is often identified with sin, on the basis of the interpretation of Romans 7: 14-24:
“For we know
that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin. For what I
am doing, I do not understand. For what I will to do, that I do not
practise; but what I hate, that I do. If, then, I do what I will not to
do, I agree with the law that it is good. But now, it is no longer I who
do it, but sin that dwells in me. For I know that in me (that is, in my
flesh) nothing good dwells; for to will is present with me, but how to
perform what is good I do not find. For the good that I will to do, I do
not do; but the evil I will not to do, that I practise. Now if I do
what I will not to do, it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells
in me. I find then a law, that evil is present with me, the one who
wills to do good. For I delight in the law of God according to the
inward man. But I see another law in my members, warring against the law
of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is
in my members.”
Personalists read into this passage the
conflict between nature and person, that is to say, the conflict between
innately sinful nature and the free person. Instead of seeing the law
of sin that dwells in human beings, they see sin as human nature itself,
from which they must be delivered. Most regrettably, the writer of the
article himself affirms the truth of this by saying: “St Paul spoke to
the Romans about the conflict of the ‘law of the mind’ and the ‘law of
the body.’ Yes, he did not use the words person and nature, but one
cannot expect that from a first century Christian anyhow. Nevertheless,
is not his a distinction between personal freedom and natural
determinism?” In other words, the law of sin is natural determinism. The
question that easily arises is: Isn’t God who creates nature?
Therefore, does God create sin? How far removed is this idea from
Apollinarianism and its Manichaeistic consequences? The writer is not,
of course, the only one who interprets in this way. It is obvious that
these personalistic metaphors bear no relation at all textually to the
theology of the Orthodox Fathers, never mind spiritually.
5. The Rejection of the Hesychastic Tradition
Over and above the unhistorical and
textually arbitrary views about finding the relational ontology of the
person in patristic texts, even so – textually arbitrarily, that is – no
theological problem would arise with the specific significations and
their use, if they did not serve to reject the meaning of the texts of
the patristic tradition. By serving the view that the person is
inconceivable without relationship, personalistic texts reject, for
example, the Philokalia, the prayers before and after Holy Communion,
and others, because in the opinion of the personalists these contribute
to an individualistic salvation, which does not reveal the fundamental
condition of the ontology of the person, namely, that the person exists
in relation to another person. In other words, according to the
personalist, these texts reek of an individualistic spirituality (as in
the case of gurus), which serves the innate needs of instinctual
religiosity.
6. The Marginalisation of Apophaticism and Theological Improvisation: Consequences
The distortion of facts and texts
reaches its peak with citations of the type: “The critics of the
ontology of the person are trapped in the Babylonian captivity of
scholasticism.” Whereas the tradition of the Fathers of the Church, from
St Athanasius the Great, the Cappadocians, St Maximus and St Symeon the
New Theologian onwards, explicitly discourages every kind of
intellectual interest in the mode of existence of the Divine Persons,
personalistic hermeneutics is concerned with how the Divine Persons love
each other, with the psychoanalysis of the Divine Persons, with the
reason why God is necessarily Trinitarian, using scholastically
specified outlines of the type: the Third Person is needed in order to
transcend the egoistic love between the other two Divine Persons.
In this manner a personalistic
anthropology and proposed way of life are drawn up, in season or out of
season, which, completely by-passing the incarnate example of Jesus
Christ and the apostles, martyrs, ascetics and saints who imitated Him,
rests blissfully in the freedom of the relations of the Holy Trinity,
according to which each one draws whatever anthropological conclusion
that he wishes, and that suits him, for life in Christ, whereas with a
parallel invisible and unincarnate (without Christ and His saints)
doctrine of love according, once again, to the relations of the Holy
Trinity, every anthropological problem is apparently solved, as well as
ecclesiological issues about approaching other Christian Confessions. In
this connection, sometimes in accordance with the personalistic
perception, a faithful Christian who follows the writings of the saints,
the Sacred Canons and the custom of the Church, is judged to be
moralistic, Pharisaic, irrationally attached to and infatuated with
spiritual elders, incapable of understanding the profound meaning of
freedom in Christ, and reduced to the objectified forms of past
tradition. Unfortunately, such things have been said even of recognised
saints of the Orthodox Church.
On this subject, the Synodal
announcement by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia is
interesting. It makes precisely the same criticism as the Metropolitan
of Nafpaktos with regard to the ontology of the person (http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/92464.htm). One reads there:
“The problems
contained in the document ‘The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s
World’ are more subtle and theological in character …
The heart of the problem lies in the document’s persistent use of the term “human person” where it ought to use “man”, and grounding its humanitarian discussion in elaborations on this phrase. Usage of the term ‘person’ for man emerges within Orthodox discussion in a notable way only from the time of V. Lossky, who himself acknowledged the novelty of his employment of it; and while it has become almost normative in contemporary discussions, the Holy Fathers are consistent in employing the Scriptural and liturgical language of ‘man’. The term ‘person’ is chiefly used in Orthodox language in reference to the Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity, in confessing the unique hypostatic being of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as well as the singular hypostatic reality of the One Son in Whom both the divine and human natures co-exist ‘unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably’ (Definition of the Fourth Ecumenical Council). Almost never is the term applied to the human creature (in whom such distinctions do not exist), precisely as a way of noting the absolute distinction between that which is created and that which is Uncreated – for while man is ‘in the image and likeness of God’, he is in no wise comparable, in his createdness, to Him Who has no beginning…
The heart of the problem lies in the document’s persistent use of the term “human person” where it ought to use “man”, and grounding its humanitarian discussion in elaborations on this phrase. Usage of the term ‘person’ for man emerges within Orthodox discussion in a notable way only from the time of V. Lossky, who himself acknowledged the novelty of his employment of it; and while it has become almost normative in contemporary discussions, the Holy Fathers are consistent in employing the Scriptural and liturgical language of ‘man’. The term ‘person’ is chiefly used in Orthodox language in reference to the Divine Persons of the Holy Trinity, in confessing the unique hypostatic being of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as well as the singular hypostatic reality of the One Son in Whom both the divine and human natures co-exist ‘unconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably’ (Definition of the Fourth Ecumenical Council). Almost never is the term applied to the human creature (in whom such distinctions do not exist), precisely as a way of noting the absolute distinction between that which is created and that which is Uncreated – for while man is ‘in the image and likeness of God’, he is in no wise comparable, in his createdness, to Him Who has no beginning…
The rise in
misapplication of the term ‘person’ to man over the past seventy-five
years has resulted in numerous perversions of theological language in
the realm of doctrinal reflection, one of the most notable of which, the
concept that there is a ‘communion of Divine Persons in the Holy
Trinity’, is directly stated in the document… The precise theological
discussions of the fourth and fifth centuries clarified that the Father,
Son and Spirit are united in an eternal communion of essence (in the
begottenness of the Son, the procession of the Spirit and the monarchia
of the Father), but not a communion of Persons. Misapplication of the
term ‘person’ to man has led, however, to considerations of the
community of the human race being applied to the nature of the Holy
Trinity in a manner that contradicts the clear teaching of the Fathers
and Ecumenical Councils. Furthermore, such improper language of Trinity
creates new anthropological problems that arise from seeing ‘the human
person’ as ‘a community of persons in the unity of the human race
reflecting the life and communion of the Divine Persons in the Holy
Trinity’ (art. 2.i—one of the most problematic phrases in the document).
While it is true that man’s freedom (the subject of Article 2) is a
gift arising from his being created ‘in the image’ of God, neither his
life in the broad community of the race of men, nor the freedom he
exercises within it, are comparable to the freedom of the Divine Persons
expressed in their eternal, mutual indwelling…
Yet when man is
identified improperly as a human person reflecting an improper
conception of a ‘communion of Divine Persons’ in the Trinity, his ‘lofty
value’ is elaborated in necessarily inaccurate terms. Man’s value is
indeed lofty, but the right foundation of his value lies precisely in
his created distinction from the Persons of the Trinity, into Whose life
he is nonetheless called and Whose image he yet mystically bears,
rendering him unique among all creation in that he can attain the
likeness of God through the deification of his nature…
The phrase
‘human person’ should be replaced throughout with the more satisfactory
‘man’, especially in key phrases like ‘the value of the human person’.”
7. The Case of Primacy in Personalism
Having done away with or, rather, given a
new significance to the concept of apophaticism in the patristic
tradition, the personalists, using Arian arguments, as they uphold a
completely unsupported – textually – concept of the primacy of the
person of God the Father (which has also been used lately by Muslims to
uphold the monotheism of the Father and deny the Holy Trinity, that is
to say, they use Orthodox texts to demonstrate the non-existence of the
Holy Trinity), this concept of the primacy of God the Father over the
other two Divine Hypostases is subsequently transferred to the bishop,
in order to uphold a completely idiosyncratic primacy of the bishop and
of the rank of the patriarchates in the Church. Mention is explicitly
made to what is now a common personalistic position: that the primacy of
the bishop, or of some patriarchates in relation to others, has a
dogmatic foundation in the Holy Trinity. These were all inconceivable
interpretations in the entire tradition until a few decades ago.
In Conclusion
A concluding question: Is it not obvious
that conciliar approval for this terminology by the Holy and Great
Council will uphold these interpretations, which are, at very least,
untraditional? If the writer of the article is woefully unaware of all
the above points, he cannot characterise criticism of them as a “Game of
Thrones”. If he is unaware of the criticism of the ontology of the
person, as a professional academic he should search the bibliography of
his colleagues. Most importantly, however, as a priest he should reflect
on his responsibility and study seriously the texts of the tradition
that he has been called to serve.
A final postscript: It makes a tragic
impression that the writer appeals to the departed Romanian Elder,
Father Arsenie Papacioc. All those interested should search on the
internet for video recordings of the opinions of the Romanian father on
the ecumenical movement, the concept of primacy and the pre-conditions
for ecclesiastical dialogues, and they should compare them with the text
‘Relations of the Orthodox Church with the rest of the Christian
world’, as well as with the concept of primacy as this is expounded in
Orthodox theological personalism. Perhaps they will discover there that
the ‘logomachy’ is not about words but about the truth of things.
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